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Cornhusker Economics
Economic Impacts of Food Fraud
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market
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Ago
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Ago

4-24-20

*

*

*

183.34

166.36

160.88

155.53

139.67

128.00

233.49

255.07

272.33

80.53

*

*

84.19

75.76

75.28

152.78

162.63

162.25

386.15

433.70

408.60

3.65

4.44

4.28

3.44

3.04

2.76

7.52

8.19

7.66

5.30

5.38

5.64

3.25

2.96

3.02

*

*

115.00

90.00

90.00

87.50

85.00

85.00

123.50

198.00

193.33

45.00

54.37

56.65

*

When you order seafood at a restaurant, do you
get what you pay for? Scientists from Oceana, a
non-profit marine conservation organization,
conducted one of the largest seafood fraud investigations on 1,215 samples from 674 outlets in 21
states of the United States (U.S.) over the period
2010 to 2012.They found that there is, on average,
a 33% probability that you do not actually get
what you pay for. The share of mislabeled food
was (a quite remarkable) 74% for seafood sold in
sushi restaurants and 18% of seafood sold in grocery stores with mislabeled “red snapper” and
“tuna” accounting for 90% and 55% of the relevant tested products, respectively.
Food fraud became particularly prevalent in the
middle ages when many merchants mixed cheap
substitutes with expensive imported spices and
sold them throughout Europe. During the 18th and
19th centuries, food fraud became widespread in
the U.S. The most common types of food fraud
include milk being watered down and mixed with
chalk, lead being added to coffee, and cheap substitutes mixed into spices. Despite technological
advancements that enable the detection of food
fraud and consumers ranking authenticity and
safety of food top among non-economic issues,
food fraud still occurs with approximately 10% of
the food on the grocery shelves in the U.S. being
adulterated or mislabeled.
Food fraud is also quite prevalent in Europe. In
one of the largest food fraud investigations
launched by Interpol and Europol in 47 countries
during the period December 2014 to January
2015, there were thousands of tons of adulterated
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Food seized, including 31 tons of chemically treated
seafood from Italy and 35 tons of counterfeit butter
from Egypt.
Food fraud in the form of food adulteration and mislabeling is viewed as a threat to the integrity of the increasingly industrialized agri-food system and is a major concern for consumers, the food industry, and governments around the world. The 2008 Chinese milk
scandal demonstrated the consequences of food adulteration on a global scale affecting consumers and industries in multiple countries. The scandal involved
selling watered-down milk as high-quality milk, and
adding melamine in milk to boost its protein content
and pass nutritional tests. Due to this scandal, 290,000
babies around the world were affected by melamine
contamination out of which 6 died and 52,000 were
hospitalized.
Food fraud is motivated by economic gains and is enabled by the fact that many of the food attributes consumers care about are credence attributes, that is, their
true nature is not detectable by consumers through
search or experience. Thus, while producers know
whether a product is high-quality or not, consumers do
not. While the introduction of certification and labeling can solve this information problem and ensure the
presence of the high-quality products in the market, it
can also create incentives for fraudulent behavior by
producers in the form of food adulteration and mislabeling. Such fraudulent behavior is normally enabled
by the prevalence of imperfect monitoring and enforcement systems.
Despite the prevalence of food fraud and its sometimes
devastating consequences for consumer well-being and
the sectors involved, a systematic economic analysis of
food fraud is virtually absent. Previous research on
food fraud has focused mainly on product mislabeling
and its impact on consumers.
A study based on the Ph.D. dissertation of Dr.
Imran Meerza in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska was published
recently and analyzes the impacts of food fraud in the
form of both food adulteration and mislabeling on all
interest groups involved, i.e., consumers, producers,
and middlemen (e.g., food processors and retailers).
Specifically, the aforementioned study analyzes the system-wide market and welfare effects of food fraud, i.e.,
the effects of food adulteration and mislabeling on the
equilibrium prices and quantities in the relevant food

product markets and the welfare of consumers,
producers and middlemen in the relevant supply
channels.
To analyze the system-wide economic impacts of
food fraud, the study developed an empirically relevant theoretical framework of food markets with
heterogeneous consumers and producers (i.e.,
consumers differing in their preferences and agricultural producers differing in their efficiency/
costs of production), and imperfectly competitive
middlemen. The explicit consideration of consumer and producer heterogeneity allows the consideration of asymmetries in the probability of fraud
detection for low- and high-quality producers; enables the disaggregation of the welfare effects of
food fraud (i.e., the determination of the effects of
food fraud on different consumers and producers
of the products of interest); and reveals the diverse
incentives faced by different producer groups engaged in and affected by fraudulent behavior.
Analytical results show that the price of the high
(low) quality product decreases (increases) in the
presence of food fraud, while the effects of food
fraud on equilibrium quantities are case-specific
and dependent on the relative magnitude of the
demand and supply effects of food adulteration
and mislabeling. Moreover, the magnitude of the
price effects of food fraud depends on the type of
food fraud with the equilibrium price of the high
(low) quality food falling (increasing) more under
food adulteration than under mislabeling. In most
cases, the profits of the high-quality product suppliers fall while the profits of the low-quality product suppliers increase in the presence of food
fraud.
The involvement of low-quality producers in
fraudulent behavior is case-specific. In particular,
low-quality producers will find it optimal to adulterate and/or mislabel their products when the net
expected benefit of fraudulent behavior decreases
with the efficiency of producers and the supply
effect dominates the demand effect of food fraud.
A key insight of this study is that producers of highquality products can also find it optimal to commit
fraud. In fact, our analysis shows that at least some
producers of high quality will always have incentives to commit fraud. The subgroup of highquality producers that commits fraud was shown

to depend on the social attitudes towards food fraud,
the enforcement policy parameters, and the relative
magnitude of the demand and supply effects of food
fraud.

sions of this research also include the disaggregation
of middlemen and the consideration of various successive and bilateral monopoly/oligopoly relationships between food manufacturers and retailers, as
Explicitly accounting for consumer and producer het- well as their impact on the causes and consequences
erogeneity is critical in understanding the highly of food adulteration and mislabeling.
asymmetric welfare effects of food fraud across consumers (with different preferences) and producers This article is based on:
(with different levels of efficiency). Our results indicate that, in most cases, (many) high-quality produc- Meerza S.I.A., K. Giannakas, A. Yiannaka. “Market
and Welfare Effects of Food Fraud.” Australian
ers and all low-quality producers who adulterate or
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
mislabel their product gain the most, followed by low63, 4(2019 - Special Issue): 759-789.
quality producers who continue to produce the lowquality product but do not commit food fraud. While
honest low-quality producers gain, honest highquality producers always lose in the presence of food
fraud. Intriguingly, even though the presence of food
fraud has different impacts on honest producers of
low- and high-quality products, it is shown to reduce
the welfare of both high and low-quality product consumers.
A comparison of the consumer welfare losses under
food adulteration and mislabeling, indicates that the
total consumer welfare loss is higher under food adulteration. While the equilibrium quantity of the highquality product is higher in the presence of mislabeling, the increased price premia enjoyed by the product marketed as high quality under mislabeling make
producers more likely to mislabel than adulterate
their products.
Having identified the market and welfare effects of
food fraud on all interest groups involved and the
groups which are more likely to engage in fraudulent
behavior, the analysis can serve as the basis for the
determination of the optimal policy response to food
fraud, like the optimal level of monitoring and enforcement under different government objectives and
weights on the interest groups involved. It can also
provide the basis for estimating the effects of food
fraud information on consumers’ valuation of the
affected products and for quantifying the market and
welfare impacts of food fraud incidents on the interest
groups involved. Since the important market and welfare effects of food fraud were shown to be case/
scenario specific, determining the values of the key
parameters is critical for identifying the relevant scenario at play and, through this, the market and welfare impacts of fraudulent activity. Interesting exten-
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